Dual Epistemic Justification
“there will be cases where the inference is justified one way and the relevant premise-beliefs are justified another way” (3).
That is, the premise-beliefs may be justified a posteriori; though their links to - or the inferences from - other beliefs will be a priori in nature. Again, Murphy makes the conclusion that if we
- Radical empiricism: this position denies that there are any non-experiential justifiers and insists that all justified beliefs are justified a posteriori.
- Radical rationalism: this position denies that there are experiential justifiers and insists that all of our beliefs are justified a priori. (4)
- Strong rationalism: this position argues that some of our justified beliefs are a priori justified.
- Weak rationalism: this position argues that there are non-experiential justifiers, but restricts their justifying power to beliefs that are justified in a mixed manner.