Metaphilosophy: Definitions and Questions (1)

Why Philosophy?

There are many general questions we can ask about philosophy. Many of these questions have been asked by non-philosophers such as laypersons, scientists and academics in the humanities.

A layperson, for example, may ask:

i) Does philosophy have any psychological, moral or social benefits?

ii) Does philosophy improve the people who write and read it?

A physicist, biologist or chemist may ask:

i) Is there such a thing as philosophical knowledge?

ii) Does philosophy (or the philosophy of science) benefit science or scientists?

iii) What is the nature of divergence in philosophy – can it be solved with the aid of such things as evidence, fact or data?

A political scientist, historian, sociologist or political activist may ask:

i) Is all philosophy political - by its very nature?

ii) Does philosophy simply reflect the times in which it is written?

iii) Is philosophy always to be read historically?

Philosophers themselves may ask:

i) What prose-style/s should philosophers adopt – academic, popular, poetic, etc.?

ii) Are we living in a post-philosophy (or post-philosophical) age?

iii) Were Wittgenstein, Heidegger, etc. correct to argue against philosophy itself?

What is Metaphilosophy?

If philosophy itself is hard to define, it will be even harder to define what metaphilosophy is.

One of the main questions about metaphilosophy is whether or not it's actually part of philosophy. Since one has to philosophise about “the nature of philosophy”, it can hardly help but be part of philosophy. Or, as Timothy Williamson puts it, the “philosophy of philosophy [is] automatically part of philosophy".(Williamson's use of the label “philosophy of philosophy” gives the game away.) It's conceivable that there could be sociological, political, scientific., etc. analyses of philosophy which could also be deemed to be metaphilosophical in nature. However, could something that's not philosophy in the first place also be metaphilosophy?

Nicholas Joll believes that these examples (as well as others) of metaphilosophy can be tendentious. He writes:

“We might want to deny the title ‘metaphilosophy’ to, say, various sociological studies of philosophy, and even, perhaps, to philosophical pedagogy (that is, to the subject of how philosophy is taught). On the other hand, we are inclined to count as metaphilosophical claims about, for instance, philosophy corrupting its students or about professionalization corrupting philosophy...”

It's clear that these pursuits have existed for a long time; at least since the early 20 century. Thus they don't really fit the “philosophy of philosophy” (or “metaphilosophy”) label.

Joll also stresses the point that most – or even all – philosophy is metaphilosophical. (He calls it “implicit metaphilosophy”.) Or, at the very least, he argues that all philosophy has metaphilosophical components. He writes:

“... all philosophizing is somewhat metaphilosophical, at least in this sense: any philosophical view or orientation commits its holder to a metaphilosophy that accommodates it. Thus if one advances an ontology one must have a metaphilosophy that countenances ontology. Similarly, to adopt a method or style is to deem that approach at least passable. Moreover, a conception of the nature and point of philosophy, albeit perhaps an inchoate one, motivates and shapes much philosophy. But – and this is what allows there to be implicit metaphilosophy – sometimes none of this is emphasized, or even appreciated at all, by those who philosophize.”

So what would metaphilosophy be if it weren't a part of philosophy? And even if it were distinct from philosophy, would that automatically mean that it isn't philosophy?

Analytic Philosophy and Texts About Texts

Analytic philosophy has traditionally downplayed metaphilosophy. Nowadays that doesn't seem to be the case.

The very definitions of the word 'metaphilosophy' (used by some analytic philosophers) seemed to stress that downplaying. To many previous analytic philosophers, metaphilosophy is simply the the study of previous philosophical works; which the philosopher concerned may analyse or add to. In other words, this isn't seen as contributing anything very new or original to (analytic) philosophy.

In Continental philosophy this has been called 'intertextuality'. Here all we really have, according to Julia Kristeva, is “texts about texts”. Then again, the Continental philosophers who used this term would apply it to every philosopher – even to those analytic philosophers whom contribute what they see as original philosophy to the corpus.

All this also begs the question as to whether or not commentary or research is automatically excluded from the realm of philosophical originality. Can new ideas and theories be found or formulated through research and/or commentary on the works of (dead) philosophers? Yes, because such a thing has occurred many times.

One definition of metaphilosophy doesn't seem to be have taken up by analytic philosophers. That is the seeing of metaphilosophy as post-philosophy. Now this has certainly been taken up by many Continental philosophers over the last 100 years or longer. (For example, Marx, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida, various postmodernists, etc.) Here again we see that post-philosophy can't help but be philosophy; just as metametaphysics can't help but be metaphysics (at least as practiced by certain metametaphysics).

Metaphilosophy as Second-Order Philosophy

The prime contender for seeing metaphilosophy as being separate from philosophy is to see it as a “second-order” study. This raises the question of whether or not the assessment of philosophy is, in fact, a second-order pursuit or simply philosophy about philosophy (as with Timothy Williamson). The term “philosophy of philosophy” (i.e., unlike “second-order philosophy") doesn't imply that it “look[s] down upon philosophy from above, or beyond”.

Paul K. Moser accepts the second-/first-order distinction. He writes:

"The distinction between philosophy and metaphilosophy has an analogue in the familiar distinction between mathematics and metamathematics."

Thus Moser prefers the term 'metaphilosophy'. However, other philosophers treat the prefix 'meta' as simply meaning about (i.e., not intrinsically second-order).

How can we be more technical and explicit about this second-order study?

For one, it can be said that metaphilosophy is “thinking about thinking”. Haven't virtually all philosophers thought about thought?

Some say that metaphilosophy analyses the concepts [concept], [proposition], [theory], etc., rather than particular concepts, propositions, theories, etc. Though, here again, first-order philosophers (if that's what they are) have always carried out this enterprise. However, some of them did indeed see themselves as second-order philosophers (even if they never used the word “metaphilosophy”) - specifically in the first half of the 20 century. Isn't all this related to (philosophical) mathematical “meta-theory”; which found a philosophical parallel in Tarski and Davidson's meta-language/object-language distinction?

Another question arises here. Is philosophical methodology also metaphilosophy? This is the study of how to do philosophy. I would say no. Primarily because methodology has always been important in philosophy and one can hardly philosophise at all without studying such methodologies. This isn't to contradict the Wittgensteinian point that there may be different methodologies for different philosophical problems or areas. Indeed Wittgenstein himself acquired various philosophical methodologies.

Gilbert Ryle and Martin Heidegger

Gilbert Ryle, for one, was very much against metaphilosophy. Or at least he was without actually using the word 'metaphilosophy'. Instead he focussed on what he called “methods”. He said that the

"preoccupation with questions about methods tends to distract us from prosecuting the methods themselves. We run as a rule, worse, not better, if we think a lot about our feet. So let us... not speak of it all but just do it."

Is this typical English commonsensicalism? This position chimes in with something than a fellow Englishman, Bertrand Russell, once wrote: “The only way to find out what philosophy is, is to do philosophy." It certainly seems like an example of Ryle's well-known distinction between “knowing how” and “knowing that”. And isn't it neat that he should apply this distinction to philosophy itself? Of course if Ryle is correct, then that would mean that metaphilosophy (or at least the methodology of philosophy, as done by Timothy Williamson) is a waste of time.

Martin Heidegger did believe in metaphilosophy (again, without using that term). He wrote:

"When we ask, 'What is philosophy?' then we are speaking about philosophy. By asking in this way we are obviously taking a stand above and, therefore, outside of philosophy.”

Heidegger then went on to offer his own personal slant on the practice of metaphilosophy. However, it's not immediately obvious why such questions should automatically be “taking a stand above and, therefore, outside of philosophy”. Why can't they simply be more examples of philosophy itself? Even if philosophical questions about philosophy are (as it were) meta or second-order, that doesn't automatically mean that these questions are “outside philosophy” or “above” philosophy. They're simply philosophical questions about philosophy; which have been asked since the Greeks.

In any case, Heidegger (in his Was ist das - die Philosophie?) continued by saying:

“But the aim of our question is to enter into philosophy, to tarry in it, to conduct ourselves in its manner, that is, to "philosophize". The path of our discussion must, therefore, not only have a clear direction, but this direction must at the same time give us the guarantee that we are moving within philosophy and not outside of it and around it."

Heidegger, therefore, seems to contradict himself. At first he says that metaphilosophy is “outside philosophy” and/or “above” philosophy. Then he says that his metaphilosophy has a 

“direction [that] must at the same time give us the guarantee that we are moving within philosophy and not outside of it and around it”. 

That's unless I'm a victim of “binary thinking” here. Perhaps Heidegger's metaphilosophy is both above/beyond philosophy and “within philosophy” at one and the same time. This toing and froing beyond and within philosophy may be the only way to reach deep Heideggerian conclusions about philosophy. Jacques Derrida also said (in his 'Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences' - 1970) that one can never transcend Western metaphysics because the borrowing of even a single concept from it brings along with it the entire package. That is, “the entire syntax and system of Western metaphysics” is brought in when we philosophise about Western philosophy.

*) Next: 'Metaphilosophy: P.M.S. Hacker vs. Timothy Williamson (2)'

A Review of *Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology*

The following piece isn't a review of the whole of Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. That would end up being far too long for a review. Instead I focus entirely on the introductory section ('Worrying about Metaphysics') of the editor's (David Manley) own 'Introduction: A Guided Tour of Metametaphysics'. The introduction tackles all the issues (if in a fairly rudimentary form) which are featured in the book's collection of independent papers. 

David Manley

What is Metaphysics?

It seems strange, prima facie, that in a introduction to a volume which is asking questions about the real nature of metaphysics, David Manley (the author of the Introduction) should tell us exactly what metaphysics is. He tells us that metaphysics

“is concerned with the foundations of reality. It asks questions about the nature of the world, such as: Aside from concrete objects, are there also abstract objects like numbers and properties? Does every event have a cause? What is the nature of possibility and necessity? When do several things make up a single bigger thing? Do the past and future exist? And so on.”

What if one metametaphysician (if, as yet, such a description exists) says? - 

The idea of there being “foundations of reality” is preposterous. 

It can even be said that talk of “the nature of the world” (rather than, say, the plural natures) begs a few questions too. In addition, why accept any distinction between abstract and concrete objects? Or, alternatively, perhaps there are other kinds of objects. Perhaps some metaphysicians even question that there are events in the way that others question the existence of objects. And so on.

Possibly all these questions can legitimately exist and it still be acceptable to talk about “the foundations of reality” and “the nature of the world”. After all, the discussion must start somewhere. And even if a metametaphysician rejects everything contained in David Manley's short descriptive account of metaphysics (above), these basic distinctions are still accepted by many metaphysicians and that's where the deflationist (see later) or sceptical philosopher must start.

Empirically speaking (as it were), it's interesting to note that, according to Manley,

“[m]ost contemporary metaphysicians think of themselves as concerned, not primarily with the representations of language and thoughts, but with the reality that is represented”.

Manley goes on to write that “this approach in mainstream metaphysics” has “only come to ascendancy lately, and is still widely challenged”.

In a very basic sense, this approach is classic metaphysical realism – however you slice it. Thus many other philosophers would be mad (or sad) that this is still the current paradigm for contemporary metaphysicians. Then again, anti-realism (to take alternative to this) has only ever been one option in metaphysics.

It may need to be added here that even though these realist (or non-deflationary) metaphysicians are concerned with “the reality that is represented”, they may still be very concerned with what contemporary science has to say on this or on similar subjects. After all, if science (as with Quine) tells us “what is”, then a realist metaphysician needs to listen to science. Nonetheless, metaphysicians who've been strongly committed to the findings of science have also taken various anti-realist positions. Manley himself stresses the importance of science to both realist metaphysicians and their opponents. He writes:

“And the preferred methodology for answering these questions is quasi-scientific, of the type recommended by W. V. O. Quine, developed by David Lewis, and summarized by Theodore Sider in this volume.”

In addition, ontic structural realism (the new kid on the block) is strongly against traditional forms of metaphysical realism even though it is itself a kind of realism - an ontic structural realism; which, basically, takes only structures and numbers to be real. (Ontic structural realists class the type of realist metaphysics they're against as “analytic metaphysics”.)

Trivia? Objects and Ontological Composition

One can certainly see why many people have a problem with (analytic?) metaphysics. Or at least they would do so after reading Manley's description of a particular ontological position within metaphysics.

The question is: What is an object? Manley writes:

“Some English-speakers might describe the hand-clenching situation as one in which a new object—a fist—comes into existence; others might describe it as a case in which an old object—your hand—takes on a new shape and temporarily becomes a fist.”

Yes indeed. Manley's response is understandable. He continues:

“But it is easy to feel that there is no disagreement—or still less any mystery—about how things are in front of your face. Your hand and fingers are in a certain arrangement that we are perfectly familiar with: call this situation whatever you like.”

Of course it can now be said that Manley has been a little unfair to this ontological dispute on which hundreds of thousands of words have been written. After all, many philosophers say that “intuitions matter”. Nonetheless, many other philosophers say that “intuitions are irrelevant” (or something similar). Whatever the case is, perhaps it's inevitable that we have to start with our intuitions; even if we completely reject them later. And, in this case, the words “call this situation whatever you like” is an intuitive response which many people will have – not least some (or even many) philosophers!

Nonetheless, one can see the problem with any deep trust in intuitions when Manley himself seems to endorse (even if as the devil's advocate) the position that “one is apt to feel suspicious of the methodology behind any theoretical defense of the thesis that numbers do not exist”. That, of course, depends on what's meant by the words “numbers do not exist”. (Or, more basically, on what's meant by the solitary word “exist”.) Here again we're back to the subjects of concepts and language. Despite that, this stress on language and concepts doesn't thereby erase the metaphysical nature of numbers (or lack thereof); it simply helps us to clarify what it is we're talking about.

The Meaty Issue of God?

Manley offers an example which he believes shows that the idea that metaphysics is often trivial and insubstantial (as is purportedly the case with ontological composition) is often misplaced. He says that “the debate over the existence of God is perfectly substantive and has a correct answer”. Apparently this isn't about semantics or language. Yet doesn't it depend on how the word “God” is defined? On some definitions, the issue would be meaty and not entirely determined by language. On the other hand, it would depend of what's meant by the word 'God'. For example, if it refers only to the monotheistic God of Christianity, then it's substantive since such a being has at least some determinate ontological characteristics. (That is, not only Hume's “ontological predicates”; such as eternity, omnipresence, omnipotence.) However, if the word 'God' is defined more loosely, then perhaps the claim that “God exists” may well be insubstantial or semantically suspect. (Say, for example, if the claim “God is nature” or “God is the ultimate mind” is considered.) However, it's not quite that simple. Talk of the God of Christianity may still be a conceptual confused. On the other hand, a vague God may still have determinate characteristics which can be tackled in a philosophical manner. So language is important in both cases. As for the accusations of “shallowness” and being insubstantial, that depends...

What is Metametaphysics?

After describing the nature of metaphysics, Manley goes on to describe the nature of metametaphysics. He writes:

“Metametaphysics is concerned with the foundations of metaphysics. It asks: Do the questions of metaphysics really have answers? If so, are these answers substantive or just a matter of how we use words? And what is the best procedure for arriving at them—common sense? Conceptual analysis? Or assessing competing hypotheses with quasi-scientific criteria?”

Let me repeat myself here. If it's wrong that metaphysicians (or Manley) assume that there are “foundations of reality”, perhaps it's also wrong to assume that metametaphysics is solely concerned with “the foundations of metaphysics”. Here again the subject metaphysics may well have foundations. And those foundations may be partly explained historically in that the ancient Greeks took certain subjects or phenomena to be foundational. In addition, some metametaphysicians may be concerned with the words and concepts used by metaphysicians; not with what they talk about. (Perhaps because what they talk about doesn't actually exist.) Nonetheless, in Manley's description of metametaphysics, he does raise similar questions. For example, he tells us that the “questions of metaphysics” may only be “a matter of how we use words”. And this takes us on to the subject of metaphysical deflationism.

Strong Deflationism

Many people who're deeply suspicious of metaphysics (perhaps of metametaphysics too!) will be keen on the position David Manley classes as “strong deflationism”. (That's if people who hate metaphysics will even care about a position which criticises metaphysics.) The position of strong deflationism is, of course, still a metaphysical position. Indeed whatever position you take on the world (or on anything else for that matter) must surely contain some assumptions (or even explicit beliefs) which are metaphysical in nature.

What defines strong deflationism? According to Manley, it's

“[m]otivated in part by intuitions of shallowness, they argue that the dispute is merely verbal, or that the disputants are not making truth-evaluable claims at all”.

All “merely verbal”? Perhaps not:

i) One's tempted to make the possibly trite point that even to these strong deflationists, there must still be a way the world is. And that is metaphysics.

ii) Sure, we talk about the world with words, concepts and theories; though there's still a way the world is.

iii) Those words, concepts and theories may distort or simply alter what we say about the world; though there's still a way the world is.

iv) Indeed we may not even be able to get at the world unless we use words, concepts or theories which distort or change the world; though there's still a way the world is.

Furthermore, what does “shallowness” mean here? (I'm assuming this word isn't only Manley's term for what these deflationists think.) What are (realist?) metaphysicians “shallow” about? Why is what they say shallow? What can they say – metaphysically or otherwise – which isn't shallow? And is it really the case that a dispute – any dispute – can be “merely verbal”? Is that even possible in principle?

In addition, if the metaphysicians' claims aren't “truth-evaluable”, then what sort of claims are truth-evaluable? What makes them truth-evaluable? These questions will require answers which, at least in part, will include metaphysical answers. (The critics of - realist - metaphysics may not, of course, deny that they're committed to some form of metaphysics.)

Despite my own questions, Manley goes on to say that “[i]n its new forms, strong deflationism poses as serious a challenge to metaphysics as ever”.

Mild Deflationism

The “mild deflationist' position (as enunciated by Manley) is difficult to grasp. Manley tells us that mild deflationists “admit that there is a genuine dispute at issue”; though they also believe that “it can be resolved in a relatively trivial fashion by reflecting on conceptual or semantic facts”. Moreover, “nothing of substance is left for the metaphysician to investigate”. I can't see how all that works. If these mild deflationists admit that there are “genuine disputes” here; then how can they be entirely resolved by “reflecting on conceptual or semantic facts”? Concepts and semantics are of course important; though they can't possibly be the whole story. Unless the remainder is - by (semantic) definition - “trivial” (or “nothing of substance”). But what the hell does that mean? The only situation in which I can conceive of this position (as stated) working would be when it comes to the position of linguistic idealism (or perhaps some other form of idealism) - and even then I'm not sure. Of course the simple solution to my quandary may be to read more of what these mild deflationists actually have to say on the subject.

It's not surprising that Manley rounds off his description of mild deflationism by saying that “mild deflationists tend to be motivated more by intuitions of triviality than by the intuition that nothing is really at issue in the dispute”. Here again we see the word “triviality”; which is troubling. Moreover, Manley hints that if these mild deflationists aren't motivated “by the intuition that nothing is really at issue in the dispute”, then doesn't that mean that they may well believe that something is really at issue in the dispute? And if that's the case, then how is the mild-deflationist circle squared?

In any case, can any dispute be merely verbal in a literal sense? Can any dispute be entirely “due to differences in the way the disputants are using certain terms”? Think about it. Despite saying that, perhaps my own problem is that I'm taking the popular phrase “merely verbal” too literally in the sense that surely no one really believes that a dispute is all about semantics and/or language.

Manley's second point is more telling. He says that mild deflationists claim that “[n]either side” in a metaphysical dispute “succeeds in making a claim with determinate truth-value”. Surely here the mild deflationist has to move away from the merely verbal if he's also talking about truth-values. In other words, if neither metaphysical position x nor metaphysical position y (on the same subject) have a truth-value; then that means that the mild deflationist is – even if elliptically - making a metaphysical statement about the nature of the world. He's saying that the world couldn't possibly provide an answer to the question of whether or not position x or position y has a “determinate truth-value”. Thus we're still in the domain of metaphysics.

Next: Theodore Sider's 'Ontological Realism', as found in Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology.

Integrated Information Theory: Information (4)

The word 'information' has massively different uses; some of which tend to differ strongly from the ones we use in everyday life. Indeed we can use the words of Claude E. Shannon to back this up:

"It is hardly to be expected that a single concept of information would satisfactorily account for the numerous possible applications of this general field." [1949]

The most important point to realise is that minds (or observers) are usually thought to be required to make information information. However, information is also said to exist without minds/observers. It existed before minds and it will exist after minds. This, of course, raises lots of philosophical and semantic questions.

It may help to compare information with knowledge. The latter requires a person, mind or observer. The former (as just stated), may not.

Integrated information theory's use of the word 'information' receives much support in contemporary physics. This support includes how such things as particles and fields are seen in informational terms. As for dynamics: if there's an event which affects a dynamic system, then that event can read as information.

Indeed in the field called pancomputationalism (just about) anything can be deemed to be information. In these cases, that information could be represented and modelled as a computational system.

Consciousness as Integrated Information

It's undoubtedly the case that Guilio Tononi believes that consciousness simply is information. Thus, if that's an identity statement, then we can invert it and say that information is consciousness. In other words, 

consciousness (or experience) = information

Consciousness doesn't equal just any kind of information; though any kind of information (embodied in a system) may be conscious to some extent.

Tononi believes that an informational system can be divided into its parts. Its parts contain information individually. The whole of the system also has information. The information of the whole system is over and above the combined information of its parts. That means that such extra information (of that informational system) must emerge from the information contained in its parts. This, then, seems to be a commitment to some kind of emergentism.

The mathematical measure of that information (in an informational system) is φ (phi). Not only is the system more than its parts: that system also has degrees of informational integration. The higher the informational integration, the more likely that informational system will be conscious. Or, alternatively, the higher the degree of integration, the higher the degree of consciousness.

Emergence from Brain Parts?

Again, we can argue that the IIT position on what it calls “phi” is a commitment to some form of emergence in that an informational system is - according to Christof Koch - “more than the sum of its parts”. This is what he calls “synergy”. Nonetheless, a system can be more than the sum of its parts without any commitment to strong emergence. After all, if four matches are shaped into a square, then that's more than an arbitrary collection of matches; though it's not more than the sum of its parts. (Four matches scattered on the floor wouldn't constitute a square.) However, emergentists have traditionally believed that consciousness is more than the sum of its/the brain's (?) parts. Indeed, in a strong sense, it can even be said that consciousness itself has no parts. Unlike water and its parts (individual H₂0 molecules), consciousness is over and above what gives rise to it (whatever that is). It's been seen as a truly emergent phenomenon. Water isn't, strictly speaking, strongly emergent from H₂0 molecules. It's a large collection of H₂O molecules. (Water = H₂0 molecules.) Having said, in a sense, it can be said that water does weakly emerge from a large collection of H₂0 molecules.

The idea of the whole being more than the sum of its parts has been given concrete form in the example of the brain and its parts. IIT tells us that the individual neurons, ganglia, amygdala, visual cortex, etc. each have “non-zero phi”. This means that if they're taken individually, they're all (tiny) spaces of consciousness unto themselves. However, if you lump all these parts together (which is obviously the case with the human brain), then the entire brain has more phi than each of its parts taken individually; as well as more phi than each of its parts taken collectively. Moreover, the brain as a whole takes over (or “excludes”) the phi of the parts. Thus the brain, as we know, works as a unit; even if there are parts with their own specific roles (not to mention the philosopher's “modules”).

Causation and Information

Information is both causal and structural.

Say that we've a given structure (or pattern) x. That x has a causal effect on structure (or pattern) y. Clearly x's effect on y can occur without minds. (At least if you're not an idealist or an extreme anti-realist/verificationist.)

Instead of talking about x and y, let's give a concrete example instead.

Take the pattern (or structure) of a sample of DNA. That DNA sample causally affects and then brings about the development (in particular ways) of the physical nature of a particular organism (in conjunction with the environment, etc.). This would occur regardless of observers. That sample of DNA contains (or is!) information. The DNA's information causally brings about physical changes; which, in some cases, can themselves be seen as information.

Some commentators also use the word “representation” within this context. Here information is deemed to be “potential representation”. Clearly, then, representations are representations to minds or observers; even if the information - which will become a representation - isn't so. Such examples of information aren't designed at all (except, as it were, by nature). In addition, just as information can become a representation, so it can also become knowledge. It can be said that although a representation of information may be enriched with concepts and cognitive activity; this is much more the case with information in the guise of knowledge.

Panpsychism?

The problem with arguing that consciousness is information is that information is everywhere: even basic objects (or systems) have a degree of information. Therefore such basic things (or systems) must also have a degree of consciousness. Or, in IIT speak, all such things (systems) have a “φ value”; which is the measure of the degree of information (therefore consciousness) in the system. Thus David Chalmers' thermostat [1997] will thus have a degree of consciousness (or, for Chalmers, proto-experience).

It's here that we enter the territory of panpsychism. Not surprisingly, Tononi is happy with panpsychism; even if his position isn't identical to Chalmers' panprotopsychism.

Scott Aaronson, for one, states one problem with the consciousness-is-everywhere idea in the following:

“[IIT] unavoidably predicts vast amounts of consciousness in physical systems that no sane person would regard as particularly ‘conscious’ at all: indeed, systems that do nothing but apply a low-density parity-check code, or other simple transformations of their input data. Moreover, IIT predicts not merely that these systems are ‘slightly’ conscious (which would be fine), but that they can be unboundedly more conscious than humans are.”

Here again it probably needs to be stated that if consciousness = information (or that information – sometimes? - equals consciousness), then consciousness will indeed be everywhere.

***************************************

Add-on: John Searle on Information

How can information be information without minds or observers?

John Searle denies that there can be information without minds/observers. Perhaps this is simply a semantic dispute. After all, the things which pass for information certainly exist and they've been studied - in great detail! - from an informational point of view. However, they don't pass Searle's following tests; though that may not matter very much.

Take, specifically, Searle's position as it was expressed in a 2013 review (in The New York Review of Books) of Christoff Koch’s book Consciousness. In that piece Searle complained that IIT depends on a misappropriation of the concept [information]:

“[Koch] is not saying that information causes consciousness; he is saying that certain information just is consciousness, and because information is everywhere, consciousness is everywhere. I think that if you analyze this carefully, you will see that the view is incoherent. Consciousness is independent of an observer. I am conscious no matter what anybody thinks. But information is typically relative to observers...

“...These sentences, for example, make sense only relative to our capacity to interpret them. So you can’t explain consciousness by saying it consists of information, because information exists only relative to consciousness.” [2013]

If information is the propagation of cause and effect within a given system, then John Searle's position must be wrong. Searle may say, then, that such a thing isn't information until it becomes information in a mind or according to observers. (Incidentally, there may be anti-realist problems with positing systems which are completely free of minds.)

Searle argues that causes and effects - as well as the systems to which they belong - don't have information independently of minds. However, that doesn't stop it from being the case that this information can become information because of direct observations of that information.

Anthropomorphically, the system communicates to minds. Or minds read the system's messages.

Searle's position on information can actually be said to be a position on what's called Shannon information. This kind of information is “observer-relative information”. In other words, it doesn't exist as information until an observer takes it as information. Thus when a digital camera takes a picture of a cat, each photodiode works in casual isolation from the other photodiodes. In other words, unlike the bits of consciousness, the bits of a photograph (before it's viewed) aren't integrated. Only when a mind perceives that photo are the bits integrated.

IIT, therefore, has a notion of “intrinsic information”.

Take the brain's neurons. Such things do communicate with each other in terms of causes and effects. (Unlike photodiodes?) It's said that the brain's information isn't observer-relative. Does this contradict Searle's position? IIT is talking about consciousness as information not being relative to other observers; though is it relative to the brain and consciousness itself?

There's an interesting analogy here which was also cited by Searle. In his arguments against Strong Artificial Intelligence (strong AI) and the mind-as-computer idea, he basically states that computers – like information - are everywhere. He writes:

“... the window in front of me is a very simple computer. Window open = 1, window closed = 0. That is, if we accept Turing’s definition according to which anything to which you can assign a 0 and a 1 is a computer, then the window is a simple and trivial computer.” [1997]

Clearly, in these senses, an open and shut window also contains information. Perhaps it couldn't be deemed a computer if the window's two positions didn't also contain information. Thus, just as the window is only a computer to minds/observers, so too is that window's information only information to minds/observers. The window, in Searle speak, is an as-if computer which contains as-if information. And so too is Chalmers' thermometer and Koch's photodiode.

Here's Searle again:

"I say about my thermostat that it perceives changes in the temperature; I say of my carburettor that it knows when to enrich the mixture; and I say of my computer that its memory is bigger than the memory of the computer I had last year."

Another Searlian (as well as Dennettian) way of looking at thermostats and computers is that we can take an “intentional stance” towards them. We can treat them - or take them - as intentional (though inanimate) objects. Or we can take them as as-if intentional objects.

The as-if-ness of windows, thermostats and computers is derived from the fact that these inanimate objects have been designed to perceive, know and memorise. Though this is only as-if perception, as-if knowledge, and as-if memory. Indeed it is only as-if information. Such things are dependent on human perception, human knowledge, and human memory. Perception, knowledge and memory require real - or intrinsic - intentionality; not as-if intentionality. Thermostats, windows, and computers have a degree of as-if intentionality, derived from (our) intrinsic intentionality. However, despite all these qualifications of as-if intentionality, as-if intentionality is still ‘real’ intentionality (according to Searle); though it's derived from actual intentionality.

References

Aaronson, Scott (2014) 'Why I am Not an Integrated Information Theorist'.

Chalmers, David (1995) 'Facing up to the problem of consciousness'.

Koch, Christof (2012) Consciousness: Confessions of a Romantic Reductionist.

Searle, John (1997) The Mystery of Consciousness.

- (2013) 'Can Information Theory Explain Consciousness?'

Shannon, C.E. (1949) A Mathematical Theory of Communication.

Tononi, Guilio (2015) 'Integrated Information Theory'.

• (2016) 'Integrated Information Theory: From Consciousness to its Physical Substrate'.

*) Next: 'Integrated Information Theory: Panpsychism' (5)

Integrated Information Theory: From Consciousness to the Brain (2)

Integrated Information Theory (IIT) demands a physical explanation of consciousness. This rules out, for example, entirely functional explanations; as well as unwarranted correlations between consciousness and the physical. Indeed if consciousness is identical to the physical (not merely correlated with it or caused by it), then clearly the physical (as information, etc.) is paramount in the IIT picture.

All this is given a quasi-logical explanation in terms of axioms and postulates. That is, there must be identity claims between IIT's "axioms of consciousness" and postulates about the physical. Moreover, the axioms fulfill the role of premises. These premises lead to the physical postulates.

So what is the nature of that relation between these axioms and their postulates? How do we connect, for example, a conscious state with a neuroscientific explanation of that conscious state? How is the ontological/explanatory gap crossed?

As hinted at earlier, the identity of consciousness and the physical isn't a question of the latter causing or bringing about the former. Thus, if x and y are identical, then x can't cause y and y can't cause x. These identities stretch even as far as phenomenology in that the phenomenology of conscious state x at time t is identical with the physical properties described by the postulates at time t.

More technically, Giulio Tononi (2008) identifies conscious states with integrated information. Moreover, when information is integrated (by whichever physical system – not only the brain) in a complicated enough manner (even if minimally complicated), that will be both necessary and sufficient to constitute (not cause or create) a conscious state or experience.

Explaining IIT's identity-claims (between the axioms of consciousness and the physical postulates) can also be done by stating what Tononi does not believe about consciousness. Tononi doesn't believe that

i) the brain's physical features (described by the postulates) cause or bring about consciousness.

ii) the brain's physical features (described by the postulates) are both necessary and sufficient for consciousness.

Causality

Where we have the physical, we must also have the causal. And indeed IIT stresses causality. If consciousness exists (as the first axiom states), then it must be causal in nature. It must “make a causal difference”. Thus epiphenomenalism, for one, is ruled out.

Again, consciousness itself must have causal power. Therefore this isn't a picture of the physical brain causing consciousness (or even subserving consciousness). It is said, in IIT, that “consciousness exists from its own perspective”. This means that a conscious state qua conscious state (or experience qua experience) must have causal power both on itself and on its exterior. Indeed the first axiom (of existence) and its postulate require that a conscious state has what's called a “cause-effect power”. It must be capable of having an affect on behaviour or actions (such a picking something up) as well as a “power over itself”. (Such as resulting in a modification of a belief caused by that conscious state?) This, as started earlier, clearly rules out any form of epiphenomenalism.

Now does this mean that a belief (as such) has causal powers? Does this mean that the experience of yellow has – or could have – causal powers? Perhaps because beliefs aren't entirely phenomenological, and spend most of their time in the “belief box” (according to non-eliminative accounts), then they aren't a good candidate for having causal powers in this phenomenological sense. However, the experience of yellow is a casual power if it can cause a subject to pick up, say, a lemon (qua lemon).

From Consciousness to Brain Again

Even if IIT starts with consciousness, it's very hard, intuitively, to see how it would be at all possible to move to the postulated physical aspects (not bases or causes) of a conscious state. How would that work? How, even in principle, can we move from consciousness (or phenomenology) to the physical aspects of that consciousness state? If there's a ontological/explanatory gap between the physical and the mental; then there may be/is an ontological gap/explanatory gap between consciousness and the physical. (There'll also be epistemological gaps.) So how does this IIT inversion solve any of these problems?

The trick is supposed to be pulled off by an analysis the phenomenology of a conscious state (or experience) and then accounting for that with the parallel state of the physical system which is the physical aspect of that conscious state. (Think here of Spinoza and Donald Davidson's "anomalous monism" – or substance monism/conceptual dualism - is which a single substance has two "modes".) But what does that mean? The ontological/explanatory gap, sure enough, shows its face here just as much as it does anywhere else in the philosophy of consciousness. Isn't this a case of comparing oranges with apples – only a whole lot more extreme?

An additional problem is to explain how the physical modes/aspects of a conscious state must be “constrained” by the properties of that conscious state (or vice versa?). Again, what does that actually mean? In theory it would be easy to find some kind of structural physical correlates of a conscious state. The problem would be to make sense of - and justify - those correlations. For example, I could correlate my wearing black shoes with Bradford City winning away. Clearly, in this instance “correlation doesn't imply causation”. However, if IIT doesn't accept that the physical causes conscious states, but that they are conscious states (or a mode therefore), then, on this example, my black shoes may actually be Bradford City winning at home (rather than the shoes causing that win)... Of course shoes and football victories aren't modes/aspects of the same thing. Thus the comparison doesn't work.

It doesn't immediately help, either, when IIT employs (quasi?)-logical terms to explain and account for these different aspects/modes of the same thing. Can we legitimately move from the axioms of a conscious experience to the essential properties (named “postulates”) of the physical modes/aspects of that conscious experience?

Here we're meant to be dealing with the "intrinsic" properties of experience which are then tied to the (intrinsic?) properties of the physical aspects/modes of that experience. Moreover, every single experience is meant to have its own axiom/s.

Nonetheless, if an axiomatic premise alone doesn't deductively entail (or even imply) its postulate, then why call it an “axiom” at all?

Tononi (2015) explains this is terms of "inference to the best explanation" (otherwise called abduction). Here, instead of a strict logical deduction from a phenomenological axiom to a physical postulate, the postulates have (merely) statistical inductive support. Tononi believes that such an abduction shows us that conscious systems have “cause-effect power over themselves”. Clearly, behavioural and neuroscientific evidence may/will show this to be the case.

Conclusion

Sceptically it may be said that the "ontological gap" (or the "hard problem") appears to have been bridged (or even solved) by mere phraseology. What I mean by this is that IIT identifies a conscious state with physical things in the brain. (Namely, the physical elements and dynamics of the brain.) These things are measurable. Thus, if that's the case, then a conscious state is measurable in that the dynamical and physical reality of the brain (at a given time) is measurable. Indeed in IIT it's even said that something called the “phi metric” can “quantify consciousness”.

Is the hard problem of consciousness solved merely through this process of identification?

The IIT theorist may reply: What more do you want?! However, then we can reply: 

Correlations between conscious states and brain states (or even the brain's causal necessitation of a conscious state) aren't themselves explanations of consciousness. 

Indeed isn't the identification of conscious states with the physical and dynamical elements of the brain what philosophers have done for decades? Do IIT's new technical/scientific terms (as well as references to “information”) give us anything fundamentally new in this long-running debate on the nature of consciousness?

*) Next: 'Integrated Information Theory: Structure (3)'

References

Tononi, Giulio Tononi (2008) 'Consciousness as Integrated Information: a Provisional Manifesto'.

- (2015) 'Consciousness: here, there and everywhere?'.