It's not surprising, then, that Dennett has asked David Chalmers
If we were talking about research into genetics or black holes, such words as “independent evidence” and “postulation” are certainly acceptable.
Of course this is simply to beg the question against consciousness being a phenomenon to be explained in its own right.
“the only 'seemings' that need explaining are dispositions to react and report” .
"'if something more than functions needs explaining, then materialism cannot explain it'".
Chalmers, with added irony, says that he “would not disagree” with Dennett's account of materialism's possible failings. Dennett does say that it's a genuine threat to materialism and that's precisely why he fights the conclusion and comes out with so many “counterintuitive” (his own word!) positions.
Chalmers even goes so far as to say that he holds that “what matters is the functional organization”. Thus, if a
“the term 'consciousness' is defined as something like 'reportability' or some other functional capacity”.
In other words, to such a materialist, saying that consciousness exists is simply another way of saying that reportability, discrimination, internal access, etc. exist. What's more, according to Chalmers, they also believe that
Chalmers, David. (2010) The Character of Consciousness
--- (1997) 'Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness'
--- (1998) 'An interview with David Chalmers', by David Chrucky
--- (2002] 'Conciousness and its Place in Nature'
Dennett, Daniel. (1991) Consciousness Explained