“If someone wishes to speak in his language about a new kind of entities, he must introduce a system of new ways of speaking, subject to new rules; we shall call this procedure the construction of a linguistic framework for the new entities in question.” [1950]
To
accept the thing world means nothing more than to accept a certain
form of language, in other words, to accept rules for formulating
statements and for testing, accepting, or rejecting them.
[1950]
Rudolf
Carnap said that truth is an “internal question”. That is, truth is
internal to a specific “convention”.
So
why is a convention or conceptual scheme (CS) chosen in the first
place? More specifically, why did Carnap adopt the “framework” of
what he called the “thing-world”? Why not one based on abstract
objects or goblins?
We
could say that truth (in some form) is lurking in the background,
despite Carnap’s protestations against “external questions” on
the outside of all/any CSs/conventions.
Is
there any form of truth that's antecedent to the adoption of a
Carnapian “convention”? Is it true that Carnap's adopted
CS “works”, provides “results”, solves problems, handles
experience, etc.? Pragmatists and/or instrumentalists must face these
antecedent questions even if they've already adopted a convention
prior to adopting a new one. This parallels the late 19th century
stance of the American pragmatists.
For
example, is it true that belief P is “better for us
to believe” (William James)? Is it true that pragmatism
itself “is better for us to believe”? Thus we can't apply the
pragmatist test of truth to pragmatism itself without begging the
question. Therefore there must be some kind of truth which, in this
case, is external to pragmatism.
We
can then ask what seem to be metaphysically realist questions of
Carnap (or of a Carnapian).
What
comes first: the world or the convention? Metaphysical realists
would say the world. Carnap would have said the convention. But
did he? What would have made him adopt CS1 in the first
place? He couldn’t have adopted CS1 from within CS1.
Therefore when he adopted CS1 he was outside of it. It
follows that his reasons for adopting CS1 weren't
internal to CS1. Where did these external reasons come
from? Didn’t truth, facts, reasons, evidence etc. external to CS1
determine his choice of CS1? His reasons for rejecting his
current CS, say CS2, couldn’t have come from CS1.
Thus he had good reasons for adopting CS1 which weren’t
part of CS1.
Were
they part of CS2? Or were there many concurrent CSs which
Carnap was internal to? Did he live within one CS or many? We may
need conventions, “language-games” etc., though are we
internal to just one of them? If CSs determine what we think and what
we say, then one CS must determine our adoption of another. But
there's something strange about this conclusion because CSs are often
supposed to be self-contained and, as it were, self-referential (they
are closed universes). At least many people have believed that. This
can’t be true if we can move from CS2 to CS1,
for example.
Thus
in the contemporary literature why are CSs deemed so powerful and
restricting? We may indeed need CSs in the Carnapian or in other
senses; though we can still jump from one to another. CSs aren't,
therefore, anything like the Kant's categories and concepts which
determine, a priori,
how we must perceive or experience the world. They are thoroughly
contingent and adaptable – according to Carnap himself.
On
another point. Is Carnap’s “adopted framework” a posit itself
(in which he posits other things)? If this is the case, his adopted
framework would need to be posited ( being an abstract object) by
another adopted framework... And so on. If this isn’t a real
regress, how do things get started?
If
it's not correct (or possible) to posit anything without an adopted
framework, then it isn't correct (or possible) to posit an adopted
framework unless that too belongs to another adopted framework.
Contrary to this, if it's correct (or possible) to posit an adopted
framework which isn't itself posited by another adopted framework,
then perhaps we can posit “medium-sized objects” (abstract and
concrete) without an adopted framework. Thus a thing from Carnap’s
“thing-language” may be as autonomous as the adopted framework
itself.
To
generalise from adopted frameworks to the generic CSs. If CSs are
necessary for the postulation of objects, events etc., then CSs
themselves (as abstract objects) may need to be posited by other
CSs... ad infinitum.
What
CS does a new CS belong to? Is it an “unmoved mover” or “cause
of itself”? Does a CS need another CS to legitimise it as a bona
fide abstract object ? If all objects “are relative to” CSs, then what
are CSs themselves relative to? Are they relative to themselves? Have
they come into being ex nihilo? Or are they relative to
meta-CSs (second-order) CSs? In that case, what are second-order
CSs relative to?Take a CS as being relative to itself. That would
mean that it posits itself. Could a member of a class (the CS)
therefore create (or posit) the very class (the CS) which itself
posits or creates itself as a member of that class? The member of a
class can’t posit (or create) a class unless it's already a member
of that class. Therefore the class (the CS) must come first. Though
how can it be a class without any members? Unless it's the Empty
Class.
This
comparison of classes and CSs wouldn’t work for the self-positing
CS. The CS would be a member of itself. Or the CS would posit the
very CS which posits itself. So which comes first? The CS which
posits another CS, or a CS which posits another CS in order
to posit itself?
The
same kind of problem can be seen at a smaller scale. CS1
may offer the following statement:
Statement
S is assertible
according to CS1.The assertibility of S is fine so far; though what of the whole meta-statement? What is the meta-statement assertible according to? This? -
Meta-statement MS is assertible according to CS1, in which S is assertible according to CS1.
The following is assertible in CS1: “…” is assertible in CS1.
Again, here we have auto-reference, which was earlier applicable to the CS itself.
I've
hinted at the possibility that there may be a tacit/implicit
commitment to external truth in relation to Carnapian CSs. However,
Carnap himself has his own position on truth being internal to CSs.
This is what Carnap wrote:
“The semantic ‘definition’ [of truth] is not a definition of truth, but a criterion of the adequacy (accord with our intentions) of a predicate for the concept of truth within a given system. ‘True’ thus becomes a predicate applicable by the rules of a system to sentences of the system…In pure semantics the conditions of the truth of sentences in a system need not be found outside the system but must be provided within it.” [1942]
This
time Carnap talks about “adequacy” of the truth predicate,
rather than saying it “works”, provides “results”, solves problems,
handles experience. All the previous
arguments against the Carnapian convention of a thing- language are
now applicable to his internalist semantic version of truth.
Reference
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