Roger Penrose's New Physics of Consciousness (2)

As a non-scientist, I've often little idea if statements or arguments about quantum mechanics and its influence on the brain and consciousness are true. I sometimes understand what's being said. However, that understanding alone doesn't in and of itself tell me whether or not what's being said is true (or correct). A scientist may tell me that p is true or correct; though is that enough?

Perhaps I should have faith in the science instead. The problem is, faith in which scientific theory and in which scientists? And what are the “criteria of theory-choice” for the layperson; never mind for the scientist?

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Roger Penrose's New Physics?

We can ask if the new physics which Roger Penrose demands - for a science of consciousness - is physics at all. It's of course the case that physics has often taken off in radically new directions. Nonetheless, that doesn't mean that every radically new direction is to be accepted or will prove to be successful or productive. And it doesn't mean that every new direction will remain securely in the domain of physics.

So what's the nature of Penrose's new physics?

Take one example: Penrose's position that the very-small scale and the large scale may be physically connected. Traditionally it was thought that what applied to the very-small scale doesn't apply to the large or very-large scale. What's more, it is primarily quantum gravity that accounts for this phenomenon.

How does this apply to the brain and consciousness?

The quantum happenings in the microtubules (the very-small scale) are said to affect the brain as a whole (the large scale) and thus be responsible for consciousness. Again, it's quantum gravity that connects these quantum happenings in the microtubules within the brain as a whole.

Yet it's often said - often by philosophers - that quantum happenings in the brain have negligible effect on the brain as a whole. As a consequence, critics conclude that quantum happenings in the microtubules can't be the source of consciousness. However, quantum happenings do indeed have an effect on the large scale; as Penrose himself makes plain here:

“The very existence of solid bodies, the strengths and physical properties of materials, the nature of chemistry, the colours of substances, the phenomena of freezing and boiling, the reliability of inheritance — these, and many other familiar properties, require the quantum theory for their explanations.”

True, these “solid bodies”, etc. may “require the quantum theory for their explanations”; though that doesn't automatically mean that they have effects which can be observed or which are in any way substantive. Thus all this doesn't also mean that the impact of quantum mechanics on the macro-world is important or even mildly important. It simply means that quantum mechanics is a part of the whole picture. So, in the sense of supplying a complete picture - then, yes, of course quantum theory will be required. However, this question still remains: 

In what precise ways do quantum happenings effect macro-objects, macro-events and macro-conditions?

Despite this (possibly) quasi/neo-Kantian or quasi/neo-phenomenalist account of the nature of quantum happenings on Penrose's cricket balls, the point may still be missed. (Penrose himself mentions the lack of quantum-mechanical effects on cricket balls.)

In any case, as a possible consequence of quantum-mechanical effects on macro-objects, macro-events and macro-conditions, Penrose finishes off by saying something that was - perhaps - spurring him on all along. Thus:

“Perhaps, also, the phenomenon of consciousness is something that cannot be understood in entirely classical terms. Perhaps our minds are qualities rooted in some strange and wonderful feature of those physical laws which actually govern the world we inhabit... Perhaps, in some sense, this is ‘why’ we, as sentient beings, must live in a quantum world, rather than an entirely classical one... Might a quantum world be required so that thinking, perceiving creatures, such as ourselves, can be constructed from its substance?”

Again, the question remains:

Is it the case that microtubules, quantum gravity and quantum mechanics provide the answers to all Penrose's questions about consciousness?

Quantum Gravity

Roger Penrose puts his position on quantum gravity and quantum mechanics in the following way:

“This change is to play its role when quantum mechanics becomes appropriately united with general relativity, i.e. in the sought-for theory of quantum gravity. Most physicists do not believe that quantum theory needs to change when it is united with general relativity.”

More relevantly to our discussion, Penrose was and is still is deeply aware – and evidently so - of the arguments against his position as it's applied to the brain and consciousness. Indeed when he wrote The Emperor's New Mind in 1990, he didn't have a position on microtubules. (Microtubules aren't mentioned in this well-known book.) Even neurons and neurotransmitters only get four mentions.

This is what Penrose also had to say about the opposition's position on the brain and quantum mechanics:

“... they would argue that on a scale relevant to our brains the physical effects of any quantum gravity must be totally insignificant! They would say (very reasonably) that although such physical effects might indeed be important at the absurdly tiny distance scale known as the Planck length — which is

10 35 m, some 100000000000000000000 times smaller than the size of the tiniest subatomic particle — these effects should have no direct relevance whatever to phenomena at the far far larger ‘ordinary’ scales of, say, down only to 10 12 m, where the chemical or electrical processes that are important to brain activity hold sway.”

Indeed Penrose went further by saying that his detractors would say that not even ordinary gravity (as it were) could affect the brain. Thus:

“Indeed, even classical (i.e. non-quantum) gravity has almost no influence on these electrical and chemical activities.”

Penrose concludes with the following sceptical words (as offered by his opponents):

“If classical gravity is of no consequence, then how on earth could any tiny ‘quantum correction’ to the classical theory make any difference at all? Moreover, since deviations from quantum theory have never been observed, it would seem to be even more unreasonable to imagine that any tiny putative deviation from standard quantum theory could have any conceivable role to play in mental phenomena!”

In the above, Penrose placed his cards down on the table when he said that “deviations from quantum theory have never been observed”. (Though the word “observed” may be controversial here.) Nonetheless, this is the crux of Penrose's position:

i) Quantum gravity (or the “structure of space-time”) may have an impact on quantum mechanics.

ii) Therefore quantum gravity may affect the nature of the brain and consciousness.

All the above is expressed in the following:

“.. I am not concerned so much with the effects that quantum mechanics might have on our theory (Einstein’s general relativity) of the structure of space-time, but with the reverse: namely the effects that Einstein’s space-time theory might have on the very structure of quantum mechanics.”

This is, of course, “an unconventional view-point” (or it was in 1990!). It's “unconventional that general relativity should have any influence at all on the structure of quantum mechanics!”. More basically, Penrose believed that “the problems within quantum theory itself are of a fundamental character”.

Penrose concluded – again, in 1990 (27 years ago) - by saying that “any putative quantum gravity theory would surely be very remote from the phenomena governing the behaviour of brains”.

Quantum Gravity and Microtubules

At its most basic, gravitation and general relativity aren't integrated in quantum theory. That alone makes Penrose's views on consciousness speculative. Penrose himself says that quantum theory doesn't play a part in (his) “objective state reduction”. It's here where quantum-gravitational effects come to the rescue – at least as far as Penrose is concerned.

Why the pressing need to square (or couple) gravity with quantum mechanics? Some argue that that a classical system can't be squared (or coupled) with a quantum system. (Though that would of course depend on what the word “coupling” or “squaring” means.)

So why does Penrose see his position on quantum gravity as important in relation to brains and their microtubules? According to Penrose, it's in the microtubules where quantum states can become “reduced” by gravitational influence. This isn't the case with the large-scale brain as a whole – the “classical environment”. Or at least with the brain as a whole (or its parts) taken as also being large-scale.

What's happening here is a strange a connection between the very-small scale and the large scale. In Penrose's view, the brain (or its microtubules) are linked to fundamental spacetime geometry and thus also to quantum gravity.

Max Tegmark (1999/2000), among many others, has questioned not only the relevance of quantum states in the brain as a whole (or in the brain's separate parts); but also in the case of the very small microtubules. Put simply, quantum happenings can't last long enough to have an important role in consciousness. (The consensus seems to be on Tegmark's side on this; rather than on Penrose's.)

More technically and in terms of quantum happenings, Tegmark believes that even in the microtubules (never mind the brain or its other large-scale parts), quantum superpositions within the microtubuli would - or could - never last long enough to bring about consciousness (or any other significant mental phenomena). Nonetheless, Tegmark's position has in turn - rather predictably - been the subject of criticism. S. Hagan and Stuart Hameroff (2002), for example, have backed up the position of Penrose by saying that such quantum superpositions could (or can) last long enough to have significant large-scale effects – at least in theory. Indeed there's been substantive research – i.e., outside the brain and consciousness - into interacting spins and entanglement which suggests that superpositions can have a longer lifespan.

The connections between the very-small scale and the large scale have just been stressed. Confusingly, this phenomenon runs parallel with the need for quantum happenings within “systems” to remain isolated from the outside of the aforesaid systems. More specifically (in terms of the brain and consciousness), Hameroff and Penrose do believe that microtubules are isolated from the rest of the brain. Due to the spiral structure and shape of microtubules, the quantum happenings within them remain isolated from the outside world (i.e., from the rest of the brain and outside the brain itself). However, if this is the case, how is the quantum very-small scale connected to the brain's large scale? According to Penrose, it's quantum gravity which links the quantum happenings in the microtubules with the brain to bring about consciousness.

These supposed connections between the very-small scale and the large scale are part of the problem.

In detail, the philosophers Rick Grush and Patricia Churchland have argued that microtubules can't pass on their quantum happenings to each other (or from one neuron to another). That would be needed, for example, in order to explain “the unity of consciousness”. More concretely, how are the quantum happenings in the microtubules (the very-small-scale happenings) passed onto the large-scale happenings in neurons, neurotransmitters and neuromodulators?

To bring this grand theorising down to earth, let's cite one of Penrose and Hameroff's own examples of this.

Hameroff once believed that when a subject is rendered unconsciousness by anaesthetics, that the subject's microtubules were responsible for this. As a consequence, Hameroff made a strong connection between these microtubules and consciousness. In other words, if microtubules can turn consciousness off; then surely they can (or must) also turn consciousness on. The problem is that this specific theory about anaesthesia was shown to be false. Microtubules don't cause unconsciousness.

More specifically on anaesthetics. It's agreed that in certain cases of anaesthetically-induced unconsciousness the microtubules are involved. However, this isn't true in all cases. Indeed anaesthetics can bring about unconsciousness without involving microtubules. It's also the case that microtubules can be damaged - or effected in other ways - without bringing about unconsciousness.

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Some Additional Science Stuff: Nonlocality, Etc.

Quantum coherence (at least in terms of microtubules, the brain and consciousness) is the idea - or reality - that there can be “subatomic cooperation”. In other words, there's a possibility of communication between subatomic elements within the brain. (Let's not get too pedantic about the word “communication” here.)

Thus it's the case that nonlocality can account for subatomic particles “knowing each other”; even though they're separated by large distances. Can we move from that fact to the possibility of objects (yes, which are made up of particles) knowing each other at large distances? More specifically, can we say that different microtubules (embedded in neurons) can know other microtubules at large distances? (Let's not get too pedantic about the word “know” here.)

In terms of microtubules, that could mean that communication occurs between microtubules because of quantum superpositions. Thus neurons themselves may be connected by virtue of the aforesaid microtubular connections. Indeed that neuronal connectivity rides on the back of quantum microtubular connectivity. More specifically, quantum gravity (according to Penrose) may cause microtubular collapse: it is each collapse that may be responsible for each basic act (if “act” is the correct word here) of consciousness.

Despite these speculations about microtubular connectivity also causing inter-neural connectivity, it's still argued that there's a problem with the theory that happenings in single synapses have an impact on the happenings of, say, neural assemblies.

If there is microtubular nonlocality, then there's also microtubular entanglement. Or, more precisely, the subatomic particles which make up microtubules are involved in entanglement. If we move away from the brain and their microtubules, it's certainly the case that nonlocality and entanglement are part of the same picture and both have been demonstrated in many experiments. What hasn't been conclusively demonstrated is what Penrose and Hameroff have to say on, well, microtubular nonlocality and entanglement. (That's if we can say that it's the microtubules -, rather than their subatomic parts - which become entangled.)

It's also been said that entanglement and nonlocality may be applicable to communication systems and to other phenomena not directly related to the human brain. Anton Zeilinger, for one, has shown - in his laboratories - that entangled particles can indeed be reconstituted in different places. And, if this is the case with artificial experiments involving laboratories, then surely it's even more likely to be the case when it comes to the brain's microtubules... Or, indeed, is it less likely?

Is Roger Penrose's Science of Consciousness Spooky? (1)

First things first. When the word “spooky” is used to refer to Roger Penrose's scientific and philosophical ideas about consciousness, I'm not being overly critical or even critical at all. That may sound odd or self-contradictory at first. However, I use the word “spooky” simply because it's so convenient. If I were being entirely critical of Penrose's scientific views on consciousness, I'd probably use RationalWiki's favourite word - “woo” (i.e. pseudoscience); or some such equivalent. In any case, one phrase, “spooky action at a distance”, became commonplace in the 20th century and that's about a scientific phenomenon which just about all scientists accept.

So I don't think that Penrose's work on consciousness is woo/pseudoscience. Certainly not! Having said that, I do have problems with it, as we shall see.

Despite all the above, I'm not scientifically qualified to class his physics as either “spookery” or “woo”. Then again, I do think I have various philosophical angles on his scientific claims. And they've led me to the word “spooky”; though not to the word “woo”.

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Stuard Hameroff and Penrose

The obvious thing to say about Roger Penrose – in this context - is that he's neither a neuroscientist nor a (professional) philosopher: he's a (mathematical) physicist and a mathematician. In certain senses that's a disadvantage. In other senses it will be an advantage. In any case, it's not surprising that Penrose has worked with, among others, the anaesthesiologist Stuart Hameroff.

As a non-scientist myself, it's hard to find a secure entry into the scientific positions of Penrose. Then again, not all of Penrose's position are themselves scientific. Some are philosophical; others are derived from (pure) mathematics. Nonetheless, it can't be said that only experts can have anything constructive to say about the findings of neuroscience because Penrose himself – as just stated - isn't a neuroscientist. Not only that: many neuroscientists themselves may be philosophically, conceptually or argumentatively illiterate. That may be one reason why there's sometimes a lack of progress in “consciousness studies”.

I mentioned Penrose's non-scientific position and it's strange how many areas outside science (or at least outside of physics) have motivated Penrose's position on consciousness.

For example, we have his interest in a "Platonic reality", “mathematical insight” and creativity generally; as well as in Gödel's incompleteness theorem. All these things can arguably be seen to take consciousness beyond the realm of the physical and therefore beyond science itself. Nonetheless, Penrose himself wouldn't stress this aspect of his work. He is, after all, a committed and notable physicist and mathematician.

Technically, Penrose's main motivation is that there are elements of the brain - and therefore consciousness - which are nonalgorithmic and noncomputable. Prima facie, it may be wondered what the strong connection is between noncomputability and consciousness.

Anti-Reductionism and Spookery

Marvin Minsky graphically captures one aspect of Roger Penrose's (possibly) spooky science of consciousness: his anti-reductionism. Minsky said that Penrose "tries to show, in chapter after chapter, that human thought cannot be based on any known scientific principle”. Moreover, Minsky ties Penrose's spookery to his search for “new basic principles”. He continued by saying that

"one can carry that quest [for scientific explanation] too far by only seeking new basic principles instead of attacking the real detail”.

Finally Minsky says that “[t]his is what I see in Penrose's quest for a new basic principle of physics that will account for consciousness”. This is exactly what the philosopher David Chalmers is also doing; though his (possible) First Principles are certainly not the same as Penrose's.

Thus could Roger Penrose's position be entirely motivated by scientific anti-reductionism? Doctor Susan Blackmore certainly thinks that this is an important motivation. Or at least the programme maker in the following quote does. She writes:

“Finally they got to consciousness. With clever computer graphics and Horizonesque hype they explained that brave scientists, going against the reductionist grain, can now explain the power of the mind to transcend death. It all comes down to quantum coherence in the microtubules. And to make sure the viewer knows that this is 'real science' the ponderous voice-over declared 'Their theory is based on a well established field of science; the laws of general relativity, as discovered by Einstein.'...”

Sure, Blackmore's talking here about “near-death experiences” (NDEs). Yet those who believe in this – or at least some of them - have found succor in “quantum coherence in the microtubules”. Now don't those things sound very scientific? Of course we'll now need to know what quantum coherence is. (Or is it really a case of needing to know whether or not the believers in NDEs actually have any idea of what quantum coherence is?)

Of course Penrose and Stuart Hameroff can't personally be blamed for spook-lovers quoting their work. However, a psychologist or philosopher may tell us that these two fellows – both scientists - are motivated by very similar things. After all, Hameroff himself has talked about NDEs.

Specifically, Hameroff has said that when the brain dies (or stops functioning), the information within that brain's microtubules remains alive (as it were) or intact. Moreover, the information of the microtubules leaks out into the world (or, well, into the universe). Not only that: this microtubular information remains intact and bound together because of the power of quantum coherence.

Hameroff goes even further. He's stated that this phenomenon explains why the subject can experience – see? - himself hovering over his own body. That is, Hameroff seems to endorse near-death experiences. Yet even if “information” (P.M.S. Hacker would have a field day with this word – see here) did leak out into the universe, how would that make it the case that the body which hovers above also has a body and sensory experiences? Microtubular information in the air doesn't a physical person make. And without a physical body, there are no sensory experiences or anything else for that matter. Thus this is like claiming that if you turn the computer off and then smash it up so violently that its material structure shatters into dust, then the "information" inside would still be intact and would simply float in the air above it. In other words, the soul of the computer would still exist. Unless Hameroff is simply telling us about what he thinks people imagine (or hallucinate) when they're having a NDE. Though if that's the case, why all this stuff about microtubular information leaking into the air or even into the universe?

This spooky anti-reductionist motivation is further explained by the philosopher and materialist Patricia Churchland and also the philosopher Rick Grush. According to Blackmore,

“they suggest, it is because some people find the idea of explaining consciousness by neuronal activity somehow degrading or scary, whereas 'explaining' it by quantum effects retains some of the mystery”.

Churchland is even more dismissive when she says (as quoted by Blackmore):

“Quantum coherence in the microtubules is about as explanatorily powerful as pixie dust in the synapses.”

To put it more philosophically and simply, Penrose and Hameroff's position appears to be a defence of traditional dualism. Or, at the very least, the belief in NDEs certainly backs up traditional dualism. And, as we've just seen, Hameroff has defended NDEs.

Dualism, Intuition and Free Will

Traditional philosophical dualism has just been mentioned. Here again we can tie Hameroff and Penrose to the concerns (or obsessions) of traditional philosophy. That is, Hameroff hints that his and Penrose's positions may solve the traditional problems of free will, “the unitary sense of self” and the source and nature of intuition/insight. More specifically, all these philosophical conundrums can be explained by quantum coherence in the microtubules. In terms of simply-put examples, free will is down to quantum indeterminacy; non-locality is responsible for “the unity of consciousness”; and quantum computing (i.e., non-algorithmic processing) is the baby of “quantum superposition”.

In the technical terms of mind-brain interaction, and as a result of accepting mind-body dualism, the brain and mind can be mutually involved in quantum “entanglement” which is “non-local”. Thus, put simply, we can have mind-to-brain causation. Though this would of course depend on seeing the mind as not being the brain or not even being physical (in a strict or even a non-strict sense). This would put both the mind and brain in the same holistic package and that would help all of us explain.... just about everything!

Another example of Penrose going beyond science/neuroscience is his reliance on Kurt Gödel's incompleteness theorem. These show him that the brain can (or could) perform that which no computer could perform. From that, Penrose concludes that consciousness may be non-algorithmic. And, as a further consequence, it will be the case that the brain and consciousness can't be accounted for in terms of a Turing-machine computers. And if this were the case, it would take Penrose beyond Artificial Intelligence and perhaps beyond all physicalist notions of mind and consciousness.

Now for free will.

As many philosophical commentators on free will have stated, how would quantum randomness give us free will? (That's a question from those philosophers who accept the words “free will” in the first place.) Indeed how would it give us any kind of coherent consciousness or cognitive activity? Having said that, it's not the case (or not necessarily the case) that something's being non-algorithmic (or non-computable) is also a case of its being random in nature. Penrose, for one, doesn't square his own version of “state reduction” with randomness. 

Despite just attempting to save Penrose's position from accusations of randomness, his “objective state reduction” can still be explained in terms of stochastic processes. Such processes would also be indeterministic; as well as probabilistic. However, does the stochastic, indeterministic or probabilistic give us something better than (pure) randomness when it comes to the brain, mind and consciousness? Surely free will, for one, can't be any of these things. (Though that would depend on definitions and a whole host of other things.) And how would consciousness - as well as cognitive activity generally - fair when it comes to stochastic, indeterministic or probabilistic processes? Nonetheless, computers fair well with these things. That is, indeterministic, probabilistic or stochastic processes can be implemented in computers. In other words, such processes are computable! Thus that must also mean that they can be found in brains too. However, does that automatically answer the question as to whether or not these strange things can give us free will, systematic cognitive activity and consciousness; as well as the (phenomenological) unity of consciousness or the self?

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Note

1 The Hard Problem of Consciousness (to use Germanic capitals) isn't answered by anything that Penrose has to say. Or at least that's often the accusation. Whatever it is that Penrose has to say about microtubules, intuition and quantum this, that and the other, none of it will tell us why we have subjective experience; or why the experience of a red rose is the way it is.

Quantum mechanics may be at the heart of the nature of consciousness; though it doesn't (as yet) answer the hard question. It doesn't tell us why quantum x gives rise to non-quantum experience y or why experience y feels the way it feels.

In terms of subjective experience, Penrose's quantum business doesn't explain to us why we experience “the unitary sense of self” either. A philosopher like Daniel Dennett - and I tend to agree - would say that we don't actually have an experience of the unitary sense of self... though, if we do....Having said all that, these hard questions may be entirely bogus.

Metaphilosophy: Examples and Problems (4)

What is Philosophy?

It's perhaps ironic that Ludwig Wittgenstein's rejection of metaphilosophy (or, at the least, his rejection of the analogy between a metalanguage/object-language and metaphilosophy/philosophy) can itself be seen as being metaphilosophical in nature. (This position can be found in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations; as well as elsewhere.) After all, one needs to take a position beyond (meta) or “about” the possible relation between philosophy and a metaphilosophy in order to see that relation as “nonsense”. Of course we can say that, in this case, all sorts of philosophers have therefore engaged in metaphilosophy.

However, when philosophers like Wittgenstein have told us what philosophy is, what they've really told us is what they think philosophy should be. In other words, their positions weren't descriptive: they were normative.

Take the proto-analytic philosophers of the late 19^th century and early 20^th centuries (e.g., Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein).

They believed that all philosophy is (or should be) the analysis of what they called “propositions”. Why did they believe this? Basically it was because they also believed that propositions captured the joints of reality or the world. (Or at least the analysis of such propositions did.) Now, from a metaphilosophical position (or intuitively - if one accepts intuitions), this seems like a remarkable claim. Why should propositions have any direct relation to the world - never mind be capable of uncovering its “deep structure”? This may of course be an intuitive response based on seeing propositions as simply linguistic items; which wasn't seen to be the case with these early analytic philosophers. Propositions were seen as being part of world – at least of the abstract world.

Not long after this, it can be seen that other philosophers and schools of philosophy also took what can be seen as a metaphilosophical - as well as normative - position on the question “What is philosophy?”.

For example, the logical positivists wanted to erase metaphysics from the philosophical world. The ordinary language philosophers went back to the position of seeing the fundamental importance of analysing propositions. Except that this time they were thinking in terms of natural-language statement rather than logical or abstract propositions. From this position arose the metaphysical stance that ordinary language itself is – or should be - paramount in philosophy. Ignoring the nature of everyday language - “ordinary language philosophers” argued - leads to “metaphysical nonsense”, illusions and “meaninglessness”.

There's also the explicit metaphilosophical question of whether philosophy should be descriptive or “revisionary” (i.e., normative). This was exemplified by, amongst others, Peter Strawson in his book Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics (1959). One consequence of accepting a descriptive stance is to believe that philosophy is – or must be - continuous with science.

Here it's very clear that a decision as to whether one does descriptive or revisionary philosophy is a metaphilosophical in nature. After all, a philosopher could do both. Indeed another metaphilosopher may reject this descriptive/revisionary “opposition” entirely.

First Philosophy?

There are of course massive philosophical assumptions involved in a belief in a First Philosophy. Can there be such a thing as a First Philosophy? And, even if there is such a thing, why should it be ontology, logic, epistemology or even politics? Can such a First Philosophy truly come before all other kinds of philosophy or is it just a case that philosophers have assumed that without actually displaying it?

Perhaps more relevantly (that's if the questions just asked aren't in themselves metaphilosophical), is First Philosophy metaphilosophy? Is taking the position that ontology, logic, epistemology, ethics or politics is a First Philosophy a metaphilosophical position. Does it matter anyway?

It's also quite possible that there can be a conflation between those philosophers who believe that philosophy must have a First Philosophy and those very same philosophers being metaphilosophers. Unless, of course, the championship of a particular First Philosophy is an example of metaphilosophy!

Take the case of Descartes.

Descartes took epistemology to be First Philosophy - at least as seen from a 20^th century perspective. Indeed one well-known book of his is called Meditations on First Philosophy. (Descartes didn't use the word “epistemology”.)

Descartes believed that the Cogito - and everything that followed from it - would be foundational; not only to philosophy itself but also science. This is almost the same position Husserl adopted some 200 years later.

Husserl himself developed the “phenomenological method” in order to enable philosophy to provide a “foundational science” of cognition whose results would then be used in science. Thus Husserl believed that philosophy had a very distinct role. He also believed that he knew exactly what that role is.

Further back (as well as in less detail), ontology was once deemed to be First Philosophy. (Ontology – or at least “metaontology” - is experiencing a modest comeback in recent years.) In the 19^th century, it can be argued that Frege believed that logic is First Philosophy. In the 20^th century, analytic philosophers have variously seen the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind to be First Philosophy. (Though, of course, they never used the words “first philosophy” - certainly not with platonic capitals!) Emmanuel Levinas and even Jacques Derrida can be seen as seeing ethics – or Ethics - to be First Philosophy. (Levinas, in his Totality and Infinity, actually said this.) However, in terms of Continental philosophy as a whole, one can easily argue that most post-World War Two philosophers saw politics (or, at the least, the philosophy of politics or even political philosophy) as being First Philosophy.

Politics as First Philosophy?

Perhaps the best and most interesting examples of seeing politics as First Philosophy can be seen by those who advanced “critical theory”. The work of Jürgen Habermas can also be put in this mold. Indeed, when such philosophers called their work “postmetaphysical thinking”, was that an acknowledgement that politics had become primary in their philosophies?

Going back in time, it can be argued that Martin Heidegger's believed politics to be First Philosophy. However, it's certainly true that he would haven't said that himself. Nonetheless, as an adherent of a postmetaphysical approach, Heidegger did see metaphysics as being strongly connected to the ills of modern society. Surely that's a political - or at least a moral - stance on metaphysics and philosophy as a whole.

Ironically, Heidegger's essentially conservative (or “reactionary”) position influenced Derrida's own stance on the deconstruction of Western metaphysics. Derrida too placed ethics or politics in the First Philosophy position. He too saw very strong connections between metaphysics and bad politics or bad morality. (Again, Derrida, like Heidegger before him, would never have put it this simply himself.) More precisely, Derrida wanted to question the many “assumptions” of previous Western philosophy. Why? Because he took a political and/or ethical stance against all of them them; as well as against their consequences. Thus politics was First Philosophy to Derrida.

Philosophy and Science

One of the most important metaphilosophical pursuits is seeing whether or not philosophy is or is not a science. In addition, this pursuit will also involve the adumbrating the similarities and dissimilarities between philosophy and science. (A strong distinction between science and philosophy was of course made by the early (as well as late) Wittgenstein and some of the logical positivists.)

Firstly, it can be argued that philosophical questions don't have empirical answers. They can't be answered with recourse to experiment or observation. (Timothy Williamson, Laurence BonJour and others think otherwise.) In parallel to this, some philosophers have argued that only science can answer questions which involve empirical elements. However, surely it can't be the case that a question which includes empirical elements has no philosophical elements. Indeed even a question or statement that's seemingly entirely empirical must include philosophical assumptions and may, as a consequence, need a philosophical analysis.

Other philosophers believe that philosophy is (or should be) continuous with science. However, seeing science and philosophy as being continuous is far from seeing them as being two aspects of the same discipline.

Take W. Quine after his logical positivist days.

Quine too saw science and philosophy as being continuous. He didn't see philosophy itself as being a science. Indeed he placed science in a higher rank than philosophy. In simple terms, science told us “what there is”, and only then did philosophy (or logic and ontology) get to work on what science has told us.

Three Specific Examples

Analytic Philosophy

Many analytic philosophers (at least until relatively recently) certainly wouldn't see the position – or positions! - of analytic philosophers to be metaphilosophical in nature. Yet in order to see philosophy as being (according to the Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy) "the disinterested pursuit of knowledge for its own sake" (or even to see it as being a – purely? - theoretical and technical pursuit), one has to have taken various metaphilosophical positions on philosophy itself. The analytic approach and the analytic style, after all, didn't simply fall from the sky into the laps of philosophers. Thus I can only presume that at least some analytic philosophers studied a few philosophers who certainly couldn't have been classed as analytic philosophers. Not that every analytic philosopher - and certainly not every student of analytic philosophy - will have needed to engage in these navel-gazing reflections. It only needs to have been the original analytic philosophers - as well as a few later ones - who did so. The rest will have simply ridden on the backs of these prior metaphilosophical reflections on the proper (or true) nature of philosophy.

It's also very ironic and surprising (at least to me) that some analytic philosophers have been influenced by a strain of Richard Rorty's (or pragmatist) thought. They too see philosophy in broad terms. In terms of politics, some of them believe that analytic philosophers should be much more “politically committed”. And, in parallel, they believe that philosophers should stop obsessing about many (or all?) of those traditional and trite philosophical problems.

This itself begs philosophical questions. Why be politically committed at all? Moreover, why be committed to specific political goals? I mention specificity because you can bet that such (pragmatist) analytic philosophers will be committed to very specific political goals. This can be expressed in another way by asking a simple (though long) question:

If a philosopher became committed to the wrong political goals and actions, would such a proponent of “political commitment” be just as happy with that as he would be if the philosopher concerned were committed to his own political goals?

I doubt it.

Pragmatism

It seems be clear the pragmatist position on philosophy (as with others) is normative in nature. Perhaps, in at least certain cases, it's also moral or political. By definition, most pragmatists believe that philosophy should be a applicative (indeed pragmatic) pursuit. Of course philosophical questions may need to be asked as to what philosophical pursuits are practical and why usefulness is so important.

Pragmatists may also say that philosophy should help us develop “fruitful lives” or “meaningful lives”. This begs even more philosophical questions. What kind of meaningful lives? What is it to have a meaningful life? Why should we care at all about having a meaningful life? And, more sceptically, one can't help but assume (as with analytic philosophers earlier) that when a pragmatist talks about developing a “meaningful life” he has something very specific in mind. (Such as, say, becoming “politically engaged” or even religiously engaged.)

Richard Rorty - who's sometimes called a neopragmatist - is even more explicit about the nature of his non-philosophical ends. He explicitly states that philosophy should be a tool of the philosopher's political, social and cultural goals, causes and dreams. This position clearly needs a non-pragmatic philosophical defence in order to stop it from being philosophically circular in nature. Yet Rorty - being Rorty - would probably have denied that and said something “ironic” or clever such as:

One's philosophical commitments to specific political, social and cultural goals is ultimately a mater of faith, not philosophy or reason.

So when pragmatists - and even a few analytic philosophers - say that philosophy should treat “real problems”, another philosopher can simply ask: Why? He can also ask: What, exactly, is a “real problem”? Even a commitment to “applied ethics” (which, presumably, tackles real problems) can motivate such questions.

For example, take the ultimate meta-ethical question: Why be moral at all? If a philosopher takes a position of amoralism or immoralism; then, presumably, he wouldn't have much work to do in applied ethics or ethics generally. Or perhaps he would. It's feasible that he could take an amoral or immoral position on all ethical positions. Though surely that would be hard work.

Philosophical Naturalism

Philosophical naturalism is certainly a metaphilosophical position in the simple sense that it takes a position on how philosophy should be done. Moreover, it says that there is indeed progress in philosophy if and only if (to use a cliché from analytic philosophy) philosophy takes strong account of science. Philosophical naturalists therefore believe that philosophical problems are “tractable through the methods of the empirical sciences”. Thus if science progresses or can solve problems, then so too can (naturalistic) philosophy.

Psychology is such a science; at least according to Quine. In his Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (1977), he wrote:

“The stimulation of his sensory receptors is all the evidence anybody has had to go on, ultimately, in arriving at his picture of the world. Why not just see how this construction really proceeds? Why not settle for psychology?”

There are of course philosophical problems with philosophical naturalism and not all these problems will be relevant to all debates on metaphilosophy. The main problem is whether or not naturalistic philosophy can completely forgo the normative (at least in epistemology) and thus ever be entirely descriptive (if that ever was - or could be - the case).

Some naturalistic philosophers go one step further than Quine and other naturalists by actually doing science. One may therefore ask: If they actually do science, then aren't they scientists? How are these philosophers – called “experimentalists” by some - still actually philosophers? What does it mean to say that experimental philosophers do science?

Well, some philosophical experimentalists actually do empirical tests. Isn't this is simply one step on from Quine's subservience to psychology? And, of course, psychology and cognitive science can tell you, for example, how it is that people reason. Or, in Quine's case, how it is that they take in “sensory stimulation” and what it is they do with that information. Indeed one step further on from this would be for such psychologists to see how physicists take in sensory stimulation and then see what they do with that information.¹

The obvious question now is:

Why should the collective way in which physicists take in information - and then make use of it - be of interest to a philosopher?

If physicists - according to Quine and other naturalists - tell us what there is, then finding out how such physicists take in sensory information - and then make use of that information - will be relevant to what philosophers also do. If philosophers ignore all this, then they'll be philosophising in the dark; and thus, perhaps, they'll be relying on their intuitions (on which much has been written).

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Note

1 A metaphilosopher - or simply a philosopher! - may comment on the relation between intuitions and a priori theorising and reject both. As a consequence of this, he may well make use of empirical research in his philosophical work. This may therefore be seen as a metaphilosophical position in that if one rejects a priori theorising and/or intuitions (or at least rejects one's reliance on them in philosophy), then one most also reject the large chunks of analytic philosophy which are said to use intuitions to get the philosophical ball rolling – or indeed to do more than that. (Ontic structural realists, for example, take a very strong stance against philosophical intuitions and see them as being basically irrelevant.) Again it can be asked if this is simply a philosophical dispute, not an example of a metaphilosophical stance. Would this rejection of intuitions be what's called “experimental philosophy”? Not necessarily, though it can be.